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Abstract 
Our working hypothesis is that cross-cultural differences in tax compliance behavior 
have foundations in the institutions of tax administration and citizen assessment of the 
quality of governance. Tax compliance being a complex behavioral issue, its 
investigation requires use of a variety of methods and data sources. Results from 
artefactual field experiments conducted in countries with substantially different political 
histories and records of governance quality demonstrate that observed differences in 
tax compliance levels persist over alternative levels of enforcement. The experimental 
results are shown to be robust by replicating them for the same countries using survey 
response measures of tax compliance. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the more vexing problems for policy makers in developing and transition 
economies is encouraging high levels of tax compliance. This issue is independent of 
the overall tax “take” from GDP. As Cowell (1990, p. 6) notes, “the issue of evasion is, 
unlike other illegal activities, inseparably bound up with the instruments of fiscal control 
that the government attempts to use in carrying out its economic policy.” While reducing 
evasion improves the government’s revenue, it is a broader issue for the development 
of a civil order (Knack and Keefer, 1997). 
 
However, reducing tax evasion is often not simply a matter of applying higher penalties 
and/or increasing the frequency of audits. Extreme penalties may backfire by creating a 
setting in which bribery and corruption are more prevalent with the end result being 
lower tax compliance and a general loss of trust in public institutions. Designing 
effective policies for reducing tax evasion requires understanding the behavioral 
aspects of the tax compliance decision. Individual attitudes toward compliance have 
been shown to be a function of social and cultural norms (Elster, 1989; Naylor, 1989). If 
such attitudes would carry over to actual compliance, enhancing these norms, as 
through increasing overall trust in government, is a desirable policy instrument to 
complement the usual enforcement options. Botswana and South Africa provide a good 
test of this hypothesis. These countries have experienced strikingly different social 
histories, despite being geographic neighbors and achieving independence at about the 
same time. Thus, these countries offer a natural, or field, experiment for the 
investigation of the effects of tax morale stemming from perceptions of public 
institutions. 
 
We report on analyses of data derived from surveys and from an artefactual field 
experiment to investigate the effects of political norms on compliance behavior. Tax 
compliance is a complex behavioral issue, and investigation requires the use of a 
variety of methods and data sources as each instrument has strength and weaknesses. 
The use of survey and experimental data permits a broader exploration of the effects of 
such norms on tax compliance behavior and provides a robustness check. Our 
approach is to conduct an artefactual field experiment (following the taxonomy 
presented by Harrison and List, 2004) utilizing the comparative advantage of laboratory 
experiments (the potential to control for extraneous factors and to manipulate the 
variables of interest) in conjunction with the richer decision setting and participant pool 
that is available in the field. It is this richer setting and a participant pool consisting 
largely of working adults that allows political norms into our analysis and a test of the 
effect of these on compliance behavior. 
 
The experimental and survey results reported in this paper provide support for the 
hypothesis that tax compliance increases with individual perceptions of good 
governance. The responses to the usual enforcement mechanisms (audits and 
penalties) are shown to be enhanced by these perceptions, which we can call tax 
morale, defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes arising from the moral obligation 
to pay taxes as a contribution to society. In the settings investigated via our artefactual 
field experiments, baseline compliance varies as expected given the political and social 
histories of the two countries, and while compliance does increase with enforcement 
effort, the effect is less in the country for which governance is less good. The results 
reported provide support for a model of tax compliance behavior that extends beyond 
the typical “economics of crime” approach with its emphasis on enforcement effort and 
deterrence.  
 
Analyses of data from surveys of public attitudes toward government show that 
perceptions of fairness and efficacy are considerably higher in Botswana and self-
reported tax compliance is higher. Tax compliance is difficult to observe in the field 
since it is an illegal, hence hidden, activity and direct observations are available only for 
the small fraction of taxpayers actually audited. The results from our experiments, which 
allow us to implement identical enforcement policies in both countries, demonstrate 
differences in compliance behavior consistent with the social norms implied from the 
survey data. Similarities in the tax systems permit use of the same jargon in each 
country and since English is widely used in both countries we are able to conduct the 
experiments in a common language. These features facilitate our comparison of tax 
compliance behavior across these otherwise divergent cultures. Our artefactual field 
experiments were conducted in the fall of 1999 and the survey data were collected 
during 1999–2000. 
 
Deficiencies in field data are well known and true field experiments are rare owing to the 
costs and complexities of manipulating the actual tax collection system. A creative 
attempt in the use of a field experiment is Slemrod et al. (2001) who, working with the 
State of Minnesota, sent a letter (in January 1994) to a stratified random sample of 
roughly 2000 Minnesota taxpayers informing them that the tax returns they were about 
to file would be “closely examined”. This experiment was designed to learn whether 
informing individuals about an increase in the probability of audit prior to filing a tax 
return would in fact increase their compliance. In the absence of actual audits, the focus 
was on investigating the income reporting behavior of the taxpayers, an indirect 
measure of compliance. 
 
2. The analytics of the tax compliance decision 
The basic compliance model is based on Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki 
(1974). Suppose that an individual receives a fixed amount of income I and must 
choose how much to declare to the tax authorities. Declared income D is taxed at the 
rate t. Unreported income is not taxed; however, the individual may be audited with 
probability p, at which point a fine f is imposed on each dollar of unpaid taxes. For the 
interesting case where D< I, if underreporting is detected the individual’s income IC 
equals IC = I−tD−ft(I−D), while, if underreporting is not detected income IN is IN = I−tD. 
The individual chooses D to maximize the expected utility EU(I) of the evasion gamble, 
or EU(I) = pU(IC) + (1−p)U(IN), where utility U(I) is assumed to be a function only of 
income. This optimization generates the first-order condition, pU_(IC)(f−1)t−(1−p)U_(IN)t 
= 0. This is the basic portfolio model of tax compliance. It is straightforward to show, 
within this model, that increases in the probability of an audit and/or the fine rate will 
increase compliance.  
Given the enforcement resources available to most governments, the observed high 
compliance rates are inconsistent with rational behavior. Uncertainty regarding the 
actual audit practices may play a role. Audit probabilities are largely subjective since the 
tax authority does not have an incentive to reveal the entire audit mechanism (Alm, 
1988) and individuals may  
 
Table 1 Features of the tax system in the study countries (effective in year 2000). 
 
 
have a tendency to overweight the probability of an audit. Such behavior could support 
high levels of compliance even with low objective probability of an audit (Bernasconi, 
1998). Nevertheless, extreme degrees of risk aversion would be required to explain 
observed levels of compliance. Other factors must be at work. 
 
Tax compliance is enhanced when individuals view the paying of taxes as a fair fiscal 
exchange. In such situations compliance is likely to increase, ceteris paribus. In 
particular, when the services provided by the government are viewed as widely desired 
and the decisions determining the services provided are transparent and fair, 
compliance is likely to be higher. This latter factor is not captured in the conventional 
portfolio model of tax compliance. Nevertheless, it is clear that these interactive effects 
may affect tax compliance decisions. 
 
The manner by which the public expenditure budget is determined is likely to have an 
effect on the level of compliance. Alm et al. (1993) find that compliance is higher when 
the public good is voted on rather than imposed and when the political outcome is 
known to be widely supported. The means by which enforcement rules are determined 
can also influence compliance (Alm et al., 1999). Social norms and morals have been 
cited as reasons for high compliance with rules (Elster) and collective actions (Naylor). 
Even simple personal ethics may affect tax compliance behavior independently of the 
fiscal exchange between the government and the taxpayers (Steenbergen et al., 1992). 
Taken together these factors would lead us to modify the condition for optimal reporting 
portfolio to pU_(IC)(f−1)t−(1−p)U_(IN −_)t = 0, where _ denotes the psychic cost 
associated with evading one’s own tax liability if one is not caught. The greater the 
moral support for government, the higher is the size of _ and the lower the utility from 
cheating. The psychic costs associated with cheating arise only if one is actually 
cheating. A taxpayer who complies fully and is not audited (I =D) experiences no 
change in utility. The genesis of social norms is the interesting issue (Alm and Martinez-
Vazquez, 2003). If these norms evolve from perceptions that the quality of governance 
is high, we predict we will observe differences in tax compliance that are correlated with 
these perceptions. With these factors in mind, we review the basic features of the 
personal income tax system and the perceptions of governance in South Africa and 
Botswana. 
 
3. The tax systems and perceptions of governance 
A comparison of tax morale and compliance between Botswana and South Africa 
constitutes a good experiment since the tax systems themselves are similar but the 
political histories of the two countries could scarcely be more dissimilar. 
This section begins by describing features of the personal income tax (PIT) systems. 
The elements of the tax structure are summarized in Table 1. For the PIT, the self-
assessment and audit processes are similar in both countries although there are varying 
degrees of aggressiveness in enforcement. Both countries rely on some form of tax 
withholding at source and individual self-assessment and reporting of final tax liabilities. 
Tax evasion is treated as a serious crime in South Africa; the tax authority exploits high 
profile cases to reinforce its reputation for tough enforcement. The Botswana the tax 
authority seems to be (relatively) more accommodating. For example, a general tax 
amnesty was conducted in 1999. This had not happened in South Africa when the 
present study was conducted. 
 
The Botswana investigative division carries out audits in cases where tax evasion is 
suspected. Civil penalties can also be imposed for failure to file if taxes are owed. 
These penalties consist of interest (two percent per month) and a penalty up to the tax 
owed. Criminal penalties up to 1 year can be imposed for egregious evasion and/or 
fraud. The South Africa penalty structure is generally harsher; a person required to file a 
return who fails to do so within the period mentioned above is liable to a penalty up to 
R2000 and/or to imprisonment for a period up to 12 months. Further, taxable income 
may be estimated and three times the amount of tax charged thereon. Any taxpayer 
who knowingly and willfully makes false statements in the return or evades or attempts 
to evade taxation (and any person who assists a taxpayer to do so) is liable to a penalty 
up to R1000 and/or to imprisonment for a period up to 2 years. The taxpayer is, in 
addition, liable to be assessed and charged three times the amount of the evaded tax. 
The level of sophistication of the tax enforcement apparatus differs considerably 
between Botswana and South Africa. 
 
The respective computations of the PIT bases are similar. In South Africa, the PIT base 
consists of wages and salaries as well as passive income (e.g., interest and dividends) 
but not capital gains. In Botswana, the PIT base includes wages and salaries as well as 
all investment income (interest, dividends, and capital gains). The marginal rate is 
capped at 25 percent in Botswana, lower than the top rate in South Africa (45 percent). 
 
Botswana, lower than the top rate in South Africa (45 percent). It is expected that tax 
compliance will be affected by enforcement effort but also by the inhibitors that are 
inherent in the individual perception of the quality of governance. Both countries take 
steps to associate taxation with the provision of government services. Botswana’s 
political history is virtually unique among African countries. Although a former colony 
(British) and only recently (1966) gained independence, diamond-rich Botswana is one 
of Africa’s oldest multiparty democracies having successfully made the transition to self-
governance. Several elections have been held since independence, and all have been 
quiet affairs with none of the violence or corruption charges that have accompanied 
elections in neighboring countries. In fact, the government of Botswana takes great 
pride in its stability and refers to itself as the “gem of Africa” in many official publications. 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) report that pre-colonial tribal institutions developed by the 
Tswana tribes encouraged cooperation and participation and helped to constrain 
political elites. The Botswana experience is in marked contrast with South Africa with its 
well-known history of apartheid and social discord. Indeed elections in South Africa held 
immediately prior to our period of analysis were controversial and accompanied by 
violence. Both the white and black populations have reason to be suspicious of the 
government. The white population has been concerned about protection of property 
rights (especially in the face of proposals for land reform) while the black population has 
little reason to trust any government. The newly formed government (led initially by 
Nelson Mandela) had not, as of the time of our data collection, generated a record 
sufficiently long to establish trust. Crime rates were very high, and there was a feeling 
that the social order was somewhat fragile. 
 
The perceived quality of governance institutions affects taxpayers’ willingness to comply 
with taxes (Smith, 1992; Smith and Stalans, 1991). Table 2 provides detailed 
institutional comparisons. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, 
which relates corruption perceptions of various countries’ government, indicates 
considerable differences between Botswana and South Africa: Botswana’s score is 
some 20 percent higher (better) than South Africa’s. These results are consistent with 
the Quality of Governance Index provided by Kaufmann et al. (2003). Botswana has 
higher control of corruption than South Africa. Similarly, the rule of law index, which 
measures the degree of respondents’ confidence in and compliance with the rules of 
society, is more than three times larger in Botswana. Consequently, the respect of 
citizens for the state and the institutions that govern economic and social interactions is 
higher in Botswana. The capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies effectively (represented as the government effectiveness and regulatory quality) 
is higher in Botswana, which also has a higher level of political stability and absence of 
violence. Only voice and accountability are higher in South Africa, referring to the 
process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced. Overall, the 
values of these six governance dimensions for the periods 1998 and 2000, based on 
several hundred variables measuring perceptions of governance and derived from 25 
different data sources, clearly indicate a higher level of institutional quality in Botswana 
compared to South Africa. These results are also supported by the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG), constructed by Stephen Knack (Knack, 1999) and the IRIS Center, 
University of Maryland and provided by the PRS Group, which offers an alternative set 
of data to the Quality of Governance Index, with special emphasis on aspects affecting 
private foreign investment decisions. 
 
Table 2 also shows that political rights and the level of civil liberty are similar in both 
countries. To measure the variable income inequality, we use the newest available 
dataset, Estimated Household Income Inequality (EHII), constructed by Galbraith and 
Kum (2005).11 The GINI coefficients indicate that income inequality is slightly greater in 
Botswana. The Index of Economic Freedom clearly indicates a higher fiscal burden12 
for South Africa, but also less government interventions in South Africa. The Polity IV 
dataset shows, in line with previous datasets, that Botswana has more stable political 
institutions than South Africa. 
 
We utilize data from the Afrobarometer, a relatively new survey measuring the social, 
political and economic atmosphere in more than 10 countries in Africa. This dataset 
allows us to incorporate the newest data covering Botswana (year 1999)  
 
Table 2 Governance and country indicators. 
 
 
and South Africa (year 2000). The Afrobarometer has a focus on self-reported 
compliance with the following question to measure tax honesty: 
 
We would like to remind you that your responses to this interview are confidential. Here is a list of 
actions ordinary people are taking in a political system. For each of these, please tell me whether 
you have engaged in this activity or not?  
 
Avoid paying income taxes. 
 
We have coded the variable as follows: “Yes, often”, “Yes, a few times”, and “Yes, once 
or twice”: 0, “No, but would do it if had the chance”: 1, “No, would never do this”: 2. 
Answers of “don’t know” and missing values were not coded and were dropped from the 
sample. We use the survey data to conduct a multivariate analysis of tax compliance in 
the two countries. A dummy variable is used to control for unobserved differences 
across the two countries, and several variables are used to control for additional factors 
affecting tax morale. Given the scaled ranking information of the dependent variables, 
we use an ordered probit estimation, and the estimating equation is nonlinear. Since 
this allows direct interpretation of only the sign of the estimated coefficients, we 
compute the marginal effects to estimate the change in the share of taxpayers (the 
probability of) belonging to a specific honesty rank when the independent variable 
increases by one unit. We present  
 
Table 3 Determinants of tax compliance in Botswana (1999) and South Africa (2000). 
 
 
(see Table 3) the marginal effects only for the highest honesty rank. We observe that 
individuals in Botswana are more compliant than those in South Africa. The marginal 
effects indicate that being a resident of Botswana rather than of South Africa increases 
the probability of reporting the highest tax honesty by around 6 percentage points, and 
this result is robust across various specifications. These results support our basic 
hypothesis that compliance will be higher for countries with “better” governance. 
 
4. Experimental design and hypotheses 
Tax evasion is, by definition, a hidden activity. Even when there are field data from audit 
programs, these data typically do not cover sufficient policy changes to inform on the 
effects of individual policy parameters on compliance. Naturally occurring field data tell 
us little about those not audited, the overwhelming majority of the population. Given the 
non-random nature of most audit regimes, such selection issues make empirical 
analysis problematic even if we believe we can correct for the selection through 
econometric techniques. Artefactual field experiments can be used to generate data to 
investigate responses to changes in enforcement and impose the same levels of policy 
action for participants in each country. 
 
Investigating the effects of cultural norms in the laboratory raises the question as to 
whether it is possible to convey these norms to the participants in the lab. Since the 
objective of our research is to examine the effect of cultural factors and social norms on 
tax compliance behavior, to induce the participants to treat our controlled setting as if a 
tax compliance decision, the experimental setting incorporates tax language and 
terminology to encourage the participants to incorporate social norms and cultural 
factors in their tax reporting decision. In the experimental setting treatments involve 
changing basic parameters of the tax compliance enforcement system such as audit 
and penalty rates. The differences across the countries can be investigated as shift 
effects. In sum, the tax context is emphasized in order that the governance effect be 
emphasized. 
 
4.1. Experiment design and participant decision setting 
The experiment setting replicates most of the elements of the basic structure of the 
personal income tax system in the study countries as described in Table 1. In the 
experiment, individuals receive income, pay taxes on income voluntarily reported, and 
face a probability of audit. If they are detected cheating, they pay a financial penalty on 
taxes not reported. Of course, incarceration is not a possible penalty in the experimental 
setting. The individual compliance decision for a given set of parameters and a given 
cultural baseline is expected to be a function of risk attitude. All participants participated 
in an initial experiment designed to elicit risk attitudes. In this experiment the 
participants choose either a certain payoff or a gamble for ten probabilities, ranging from 
0.1 to 1.0, of the high payoff from the gamble.14 Participants select either the safe or 
risky option for all 10 choices, and this screen disappears until the tax experiment is 
completed. After the tax compliance experiment is completed the risk screen reappears 
with the participant’s previous choices indicated. One participant rolls a 10-sided die to 
determine which of the choices will be used to compute a payoff. For those choosing 
the risky option the participant rolls a second die to determine the realized payoff. The 
degree of risk aversion is measured by the probability of the high payoff from the risk 
gamble that the individual requires in order to switch from the safe gamble. This is an 
early variant of the experimental design used by Holt and Laury (2002). A maintained 
hypothesis is that risk attitudes are the same across the cultures being investigated. 
This is confirmed by our results as discussed later. 
 
Since the participant pools are exposed to identical experimental parameters, observed 
differences in tax compliance behavior are interpreted as deriving from differences in 
those institutional features affecting attitudes to government (governance quality) 
affecting the inhibitors. 
 
These experiments are fully computerized. The screen image the participants interact 
with is a simplified tax form, and the language on the screen and in the instructions 
describes the setting as tax reporting decision. Participants are told they have received 
income and are required to disclose this income to be taxed (at a stated rate) by a tax 
agency. Participants are told that only they know their income and that they may 
disclose any amount up to the amount of income they have received. They are also told 
that they may be audited and any income not disclosed will be detected and a fine 
imposed. All of the relevant parameters are described in the instructions and are 
provided on the screen at all times the participants are making their decisions. 
 
The experimental software is highly interactive. The computer screen informs the 
participants of the base audit probability and penalty. When the participant enters a 
proposed income disclosure, the screen updates the conditional audit probability. The 
probability is determined by the formula: Actual Probability = Base Probability + 0.001 
(Actual Income−Disclosed Income). The participants are free to experiment with 
different disclosure decisions until they actually click on the “File Taxes” button. The 
screen updates and informs the participants of the actual (endogenous) probability of 
being audited whenever the participant enters an income level to disclose. The screen 
also informs the participants of the outcome (take home income) that would be added to 
their balance if they were audited and if they were not audited. While the participants 
may input different values and observe the prospective results, there is a time limit 
imposed; participants must click on the “File Taxes” button within 2min and are warned 
when the time limit is approaching. This simulates the necessity of filing within the legal 
time limit. 
 
Once all participants have disclosed their income, the audit process begins. While the 
base audit probability is the same for all participants, the effective audit probabilities 
differed according to the level of income reported. The computer screen informs the 
participants of their effective audit probability based on their intended declaration prior 
to their actually submitting their tax report. After the audit process, the computer screen 
informs each participant of her individual outcome. If she is audited, she is told the level 
of the fine imposed and the resulting net income for the period. If she is not audited, she 
is so informed. The total number of participants audited is announced at the end of each 
round. 
 
Several treatments are conducted (Table 4). The experiments employ a within subject 
design. Thus, each participant sees several treatments during a session and the order 
of the treatments is changed for each session. To ensure that the data sets would 
encompass a sufficient number of treatments and be comparable, it was decided that 
the design would involve having each participant participate in three different settings 
(series A) lasting a total of nine decision rounds (three consecutive rounds in each 
setting). Since there are four settings in series A, the participants were randomly 
assigned across these. A second series (series B) of experiments was run in which the 
only treatment variable was the audit rate, which changed every two rounds, and all 
participants experienced all the treatments in this series. 
 
Table 4 Experimental design (parameters). 
 
 
The parameters for each treatment setting are reported in Table 4. The participants 
received the same income (405 lab dollars) in each round. They were not informed of 
the number of rounds that a given treatment would be in effect, nor were they informed 
of the number of treatments they would face during the session. The exchange rate 
from lab dollars to local currency was announced prior to the start of the experiment. 
The audit rates reported in Table 6 represent the base audit probability, but the actual 
audit probability is endogenous since it varies inversely with the amount disclosed, as 
discussed above. The fine rates represent the multiplier imposed on unpaid taxes if the 
individual was audited. The expected value of audit is simply the product of the audit 
probability and fine rate. This single metric is useful for comparing across treatments 
although it has no behavioral implications. 
 
4.2. Participant pools 
Participants (staff and students) from South Africa and Botswana were recruited by 
personnel at the respective (state) universities.21 In total, there were six sessions run in 
Botswana and South Africa with 99 participants in the former and 88 in the latter. The 
average age in the Botswana sessions was 25.4 (standard deviation 6.11) and 28.4 
(standard deviation 8.61) in South Africa. In all, 33 percent of the South Africa 
participants were students and 27 percent in Botswana. All participants had prior 
experience filing their own taxes. The participant pools are not representative of the 
populations of the respective countries; the pool is younger and better educated than 
the general population. However, the pools are similar in terms of education and 
incomes across the two countries, thus facilitating our investigation of the contribution of 
governance to tax compliance. 
 
For this experimental investigation, the objective was to create a controlled field setting 
with the properties of a tax-filing problem. This reminds the participants of the naturally 
occurring setting they face when selecting their tax compliance strategy in the field. 
Participant earnings were paid in the local currency (Rand and Pula). The payment rate 
in all sessions is approximately three times the average adult wage in the region. By all 
casual observations, the participants were highly motivated by the cash payoffs.  
Analysis of observed behavior across participant pools within country confirmed that 
these samples could be pooled. 
 
4.3. Hypotheses investigated 
The usual “economics of crime” result for tax compliance behavior suggests that by 
making the evasion gamble less attractive, fewer people will choose to evade. Thus our 
first hypothesis: 
 
H1.  Compliance levels increase as the audit probability increases and as the penalty rate increases. 
This holds for both countries. 
 
The experimental literature suggests that participants will bring to the laboratory their 
perceptions of the consequences and ethics of tax evasion when the experimental 
setting reinforces this through the use of tax language in the experimental instructions. 
Since the experimental parameters (tax rate, laboratory income, and enforcement) are 
the same for both participant pools, the governance background of the two participant 
pools constitutes an orthogonal treatment. The central hypothesis is that observed 
differences in behavior across the pools is due to social or cultural factors. These 
factors are predicted to lead to systematically different reactions to the same 
experimental parameters. The experiments reported here are intentionally very context 
intensive. The main hypothesis focuses on differences due to cultural effects. The 
discussion in Section 3 concerning perceptions of the public sector, the quality of the 
political institutions, and the level of tax compliance obtained with survey data lead to 
the following prediction: 
 
H2.  The compliance rate will be higher in Botswana than in South Africa, ceteris paribus. 
 
Table 5 Summary statistics—average compliance rates (number of participants). 
 
 
Table 6 Panel Tobit estimation (random effects) with series B data (dependent variable = 
compliance rate). 
 
 
5. Experimental results 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 5. The participants appeared to understand 
the setting as compliance generally increased with enforcement effort. The data show 
that there are some clear differences in behavior across countries. This is borne out by 
the results reported in Tables 6 and 7, which report the econometric estimations of the 
series B and series A data, respectively. The participants’ response to changes in the 
audit probability indicates that we cannot reject our Hypothesis 1. We can focus on the 
effects of participant characteristics, country (Botswana is omitted), and individual audit 
experience. The dependent variable, Compliance Rate, is censored, so we use a 
random effects panel Tobit estimation. The results in Table 6 show that individual audit 
experience affects compliance and that participants in South Africa exhibit lower 
compliance (statistically significant at the 0.05 level). Thus, we cannot reject our 
Hypothesis 2, that low quality governance exerts a negative effect on compliance. 
 
In the series A experiments the audit probability and the penalty rate were varied. The 
intention was that all participants would experience all four treatments. However, the 
participants were to be randomly assigned an order, and time limits prevented us from 
completing all possible treatments with all groups. There are substantially fewer 
observations for series A4. Further, the software reassigned participants to different 
terminal identifiers for each series, and no consistent means is available to track the 
participants through all of the treatments they experienced. Since the data constitute a 
panel within a treatment and we must account for possible serial dependence, we have 
elected to run treatment-specific models as reported in Table 7. The cost is that we 
cannot independently obtain coefficients for the enforcement treatment variables. The 
estimation employed is a random effects panel Tobit. The Age variable has the 
expected sign while the Occupation dummy variable is not significant in any 
specification. In three of the four series the coefficient on the country dummy indicates 
that the compliance rate is statistically lower in South Africa. This is further confirmation, 
with a different set of treatment parameters, that our hypothesis of lower compliance in 
South Africa is not rejected by the experimental data. 
 
The observed behavioral differences across the pools might be argued to be due to 
differences in risk attitudes (e.g., cultural differences toward taking gambles) rather than 
the institutional features of the fiscal sectors in the countries. The data from  
 
Table 7 Panel Tobit estimation with series a experiment data—treatment specific models 
(dependent variable =compliance rate). 
 
 
the risk attitude experiments allows us to investigate this conjecture as noted above. 
The risk taking behavior of the pools is not statistically different based on a Chi-square 
test (at a 0.01 confidence level) and confirmed via a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test. 
Observed differences in behavior would not appear to be due to pool-specific 
differences in risk attitudes. While we cannot eliminate all individual factors, the result 
for risk attitudes strengthens our conjecture that differences are due to cultural factors 
attributable to differences in governance quality. 
 
6. Concluding comments 
Tax compliance (evasion) is a complex decision that is motivated by a variety of factors. 
The threat of detection and punishment is clearly a factor, and evidence from a variety 
of sources supports the proposition that increased enforcement leads to increased 
compliance. However, observed compliance levels are typically higher than warranted 
by the level of enforcement. This has led to the formation of theories based on 
exceptional risk aversion (such as prospect theory and rank dependent expected utility). 
A promising line of inquiry has been the effect of social norms on compliance behavior. 
There is evidence that these norms are influenced by the tax regime and by the 
responsiveness of government to the wishes of the citizens. Thus, some cultural 
differences in compliance behavior are expected, and these differences should be 
related to tax regimes and government behavior. The results reported in this paper 
generally support these arguments. We predicted that compliance would be higher in 
Botswana, and this is confirmed by the results from the survey data and the 
experimental investigations. An alternative explanation of differences in risk attitudes or 
a reluctance to engage in gambles is rejected by the data. The two pools exhibit the 
same attitudes toward risk in a simple context free gamble experiment. This is a useful 
result; policy makers are able to influence the perception of the public sector much more 
readily than they can alter the underlying risk behavior of constituents. 
 
The usual caveat regarding the use of laboratory experiments to inform our 
understanding of behavior in the naturally occurring world is more in force than usual for 
an investigation such as ours. The cautions of List and Levitt (2007) must be borne in 
mind here. Does our laboratory setting provide for the necessary degree of “parallelism” 
to the naturally occurring world that is crucial to generalizing our experimental results 
beyond the setting of the lab (Plott, 1987)? The experimental setting need not attempt to 
capture all of the variation in the naturally occurring environment, but it must sufficiently 
recreate the fundamental elements of the naturally occurring world if the results are to 
be relevant in policy debates. While our payoffs are relatively small, our experimental 
setting provides the computations necessary for the decision and a clear link between 
decisions and rewards, thus reducing the decision costs. More to the point, were our 
laboratory results not so consistent with the more qualitative results obtained via the 
surveys, we would be much less willing to argue that we can generalize beyond the lab. 
As an example of the usefulness of an artefactual field experiment, our paper 
demonstrates the capability of this investigative tool to address not only important basic 
behavioral questions but also complex policy questions in ways that are not accessible 
to other types of economic investigations. 
 
Although one study cannot, in itself, assert amethodological consideration, the 
consistency of the results we report from our artefactual field experiment and the 
survey-based results provide support for incorporating the language of the field setting 
into the laboratory setting as a prerequisite to generalizing the results beyond the lab. 
Providing context is important if our objective is to have the participants bring to the lab 
setting the lessons learned in their life experiences. In this sense, a significant 
contribution of this paper to the literature on cross-cultural effects on tax compliance is 
the joint use of survey data on tax morale and an artefactual field experiment framed in 
tax language that investigates compliance behavior. Our experimental and survey 
results provide mutual support for the hypothesis that tax morale enhance compliance, 
for given enforcement effort, and our results demonstrate that the quality of governance 
has an observable impact on tax compliance precisely because we have implemented 
our stylized tax setting in the lab rather than using a context-free experimental 
environment. Our findings further suggest the relevance of models of tax compliance 
that go beyond the conventional “economics of crime” approach and that capture the 
role of institutions, in particular how individuals perceive their governments, in 
explaining why individuals pay taxes. Our results suggest that traditional remedies to 
induce higher tax compliance will perform much better if accompanied with 
improvements in governance. 
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